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EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNWORKABILITY OF FINAL AGENCY 
ACTION DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE 
NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION 
AND REPATRIATION ACT 
Adam Gerken* 
 The application of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”) creates unique 
practical and doctrinal results. When considering the application of the current law 
concerning judicial review of final agency action under the APA to NAGPRA, it is 
evident that the law is simultaneously arbitrary and unclear. In the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the Court applied final 
agency action doctrine in in a manner that was legally correct but administratively 
unworkable. The Court’s opinion contravenes both the reasoning behind the APA final 
agency action doctrine and the purposes of both NAGPRA and the APA. The holding 
further allows for a finding of a final agency action despite the fact that the application of 
NAGPRA is the beginning of a process that will result in its own final agency action – the 
determination of which tribe owns the remains and artifacts. Such a result ignores 
sensitive issues of cultural patrimony (the identification of cultural heritage as to specific 
sets of remains or sacred object) associated with the NAGPRA inventory process, which 
requires that Native American remains and sacred objects found on federal land be 
inventoried by the federal agency that manages that land. 
 The unworkability and legal incoherence of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Navajo 
Nation stems from an underlying final agency action doctrine developed to protect 
property rights that fails to properly consider the unique context of cultural heritage rights 
implicated by statutes such as NAGPRA. These rights involve the recognition that human 
remains and ceremonial objects belong to a specific culture. The application of final agency 
action doctrine invites legal claims before anyone can adequately determine what culture 
the remains and artifacts belong to. Because of this, the courts or Congress must develop 
an alternative set of rules to be used when dealing with a final agency action that 
implicates the cultural heritage rights associated with ancient remains and sacred objects. 
Such an action would account for the unique nature of the rights in question. Doing so 
would make administrative agencies better equipped to provide inclusive protections to 
minority cultures in the performance of their duties. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Michigan Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”) 
is a federal statute that regulates Native American remains and sacred objects on 
federal land and under the control of museums. In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the application of NAGPRA to human remains 
and artifacts found at Canyon de Chelly National Park was a final agency account 
reviewable by a court under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1 Normal-
ly, remains and sacred objects found on federal land are repatriated to their tribe of 
origin, meaning that they are inventoried, matched to a specific tribe, and physical-
ly returned to that tribe.2 Even though the National Park Service’s application of 
NAGPRA to the Canyon de Chelly remains and artifacts marked the start of a 
multi-stage inventory process – a process which would ultimately result in a sepa-
rate determination of cultural affiliation by the National Park Service – the appli-
cation of NAGPRA in and of itself constituted a final agency action to the Ninth 
Circuit.3 The court reasoned that the application of NAGPRA marked the end of 
the agency’s decision-making as to the legal issue in question and implicated the 
religious rights of the Navajo Nation.4 The court’s holding that the application of 
NAGPRA in and of itself constituted a final agency action highlighted the un-
workability of the underlying legal doctrine applied in the case. This conclusion 
 1. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012). 
 3. Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1091. 
 4. Id. at 1094-95.  
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allows tribes to present legal claims requiring repatriation of remains and artifacts 
without a definitive determination of tribal association under NAGPRA. 
In Section I of this Note, I analyze the APA’s final agency action requirement 
and NAGPRA’s inventory process requirement, the contributory legal doctrines, 
and the unique ways in which these two statutes interact. I illustrate how final 
agency action doctrine necessarily views the rights implicated by agency action to 
be property rights, not cultural heritage rights. In Section II, I use Navajo Nation 
v. U.S. Department of the Interior as a case-study highlighting the theoretical prob-
lems underlying the application of final agency action doctrine to cases implicating 
NAGPRA. The case presents the following key inconsistency: the decision to ap-
ply a law which begins process that will result in a final agency action is, in and of 
itself, its own final agency action. When combined with the unique cultural herit-
age rights implicated by NAGPRA (which implicate the rights of the deceased Na-
tive Americans at issue and may prevent the remains from being returned to their 
proper culture) this result contravenes the purpose of the agency action in the first 
place. The decision in Navajo Nation chooses to value property ownership over the 
protection of the cultural patrimony associated with such remains. 
In Part B of Section II, I identify some of the criticism of the doctrine as illus-
trated in its confusing application and result in Navajo Nation. First, I discuss some 
of the tension between Navajo Nation and existing jurisprudence concerning the 
final agency action requirement of the APA. Second, I discuss how final agency 
action doctrine undermines the purposes of the underlying statutory scheme in re-
spect to the APA, NAGPRA, and the treaties and statutes resulting in the creation 
of Canyon de Chelly. 
In Part B of Section II, I argue that the fundamental problem with this final 
agency action problem in the context of NAGPRA and its associated cultural herit-
age rights is that final agency action doctrine has traditionally been implemented 
to protect private property rights. Property rights are crucially different in applica-
tion when compared to cultural heritage rights. Since cultural heritage rights im-
plicated by statutes such as NAGPRA are intrinsically different than standard pri-
vate or public property rights on which final agency action doctrine is based, the 
law should develop a system sensitive to the unique circumstances of cultural her-
itage rights. 
In Section III, I consider potential solutions to this problem by proposing ei-
ther reframing the judicial doctrine or pursuing new legislation. Regardless of how 
this problem is solved, I argue that a separate set of rules should be developed for 
final agency action cases that implicate cultural heritage rights. 
I.  THE UNDERLYING LAW: THE APA, NAGPRA, AND  
HOW THEY INTERACT 
The APA lays out its final agency action doctrine in § 704, which dictates that 
an agency decision must be a “final agency action” before affected parties can seek 
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judicial review.5 This process views agency decision-making as implicating private 
property rights, and the underlying doctrine has been applied with that reasoning 
in mind.6 Conversely, NAGPRA regulates the repatriation of Native American 
remains and sacred objects found on federal and Indian land.7 The application of 
the APA’s final agency action requirements to NAGPRA renders NAGPRA un-
workable. 
A.  The APA and The Final Agency Action Requirement 
The APA, passed in 1946,8 remains one of the most influential federal statutes 
passed by Congress. The stated purpose of the Act is “to improve the administra-
tion of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure.”9 The APA added a 
number of provisions to the U.S. Code that laid out a basic framework for rule-
making and adjudication, and administrative agencies – governmental bodies typi-
cally constituted in the Executive Branch – must follow these provisions.10 
Of particular importance is the Act’s requirement that decisions made by fed-
eral agencies are only subject to judicial review when such decisions constitute a 
“final agency action.”11 This requirement is intended to maintain governmental ef-
ficiency.12 The APA provides a right to judicial review in such cases where there is 
a final agency action for which there is “no other adequate remedy in a court.”13 
Courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over actions that are not final agency ac-
tion.14 For that reason, the precise definition of  “final agency action” is disputed, 
with interpretations varying from decisions that affect broadly defined property 
rights to the effective fulfillment of an agency’s legal duty. 
The Supreme Court’s broadest approach to defining “final agency action” in-
volves a vaguely-defined two-step test that leaves much to the interpretation of 
lower courts.15 First, such actions must “mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s 
decision making process.”16 Second, “the action must be one by which ‘rights or 
 5. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling 
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”). 
 6. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
 7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012). 
 8. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling 
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.; Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 15. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
 16. Id. (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).  
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obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”17 
The broad wording of this test leaves a significant number of cases up to a court’s 
judgment. The varied subject matters that agencies oversee makes such a determi-
nation even more difficult, and this wide variety in subject matter necessitates es-
sential procedural differences in how agencies regulate. Agencies regulate every-
thing from fish and wildlife to finance to the management of the American 
electoral system.18 As such, the question of what constitutes “final agency action” 
remains difficult to answer. How can such a rule purport to be uniformly applied 
to both fishing regulations and Federal Election Commission decisions? 
Despite this problem, case law has started to hone in on a consistent meaning 
of “final agency action,” and various lower courts have defined the meaning of the 
term in specified contexts.19 “[F]inal agency action” includes approvals for devel-
opments that may harm the environment,20 as well as a Department of Labor letter 
indicating that the use of volunteer workers to organize consignment sales requires 
them to be paid wages.21 Such examples may help shed some light on the distinc-
tion between “intermediate agency action” and “final agency action.” 
Regardless, this distinction is vague when considered in the broad landscape of 
potential agency action. This landscape covers everything from labor regulation to 
the management of federal land to the laws and regulations determining the federal 
government’s relationship with Native American tribes.22 It is that final category 
of agency action that will be discussed most in-depth in this note. 
A line of cases provides a general framework for the application of final agen-
cy action doctrine. The landmark case of Bennett v. Spear held that a biological 
opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service constituted final agency action, 
because the damming and irrigation project at issue may have affected two endan-
gered species of fish and because the opinion requested that specific “reasonable 
and prudent alternatives” be taken.23  Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rea-
soned that whether a decision is a final agency action is connected to a decision 
 17. Id. (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 
U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). 
 18. See Employee Pocket Guide Fundamentals, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/info/pocketguide/fundamentals.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); see also About the 
FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); see also 
FEC Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-
history/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 19. See Pacificans for a Scenic Coast v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 204 F.Supp.3d 1075, 1085 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016); Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023,1033 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Veldhoen, 35 F.3d 
at 225. 
 20. Pacificans for a Scenic Coast, 204 F.Supp.3d at 1087. 
 21. Rhea Lana, Inc., 824 F.3d at 1024. 
 22. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012). 
 23. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1997).  
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having “direct and applicable legal consequences.”24 Even though the opinion did 
not conclusively determine the technicalities of the alternatives (i.e. giving general 
guidance on the maintenance of minimum water levels),25 the opinion did create 
actual legal consequence for the plaintiffs in the action, implicating the manage-
ment of the plaintiffs’ property – the dam.26 
In Pacificans for a Scenic Coast v. California Department of Transportation, the 
District Court for the Northern District of California helped refine the meaning of 
final agency action by ruling that final agency action is an action in which an agen-
cy fulfills its legal duty as a federal agency.27 That case involved another biological 
opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service on the basis of faulty information 
from the California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) that authorized 
continued development of a highway.28 Under federal law, the Department of 
Transportation is allowed to assign its duties as to federal environmental statutes 
to state agencies, and, here, the Federal Highway Administration did so with re-
spect to Caltrans.29 In giving final approval to the development, Caltrans (acting as 
the Federal Highway Administration) took a final agency action.30 Even though 
the court had other state-level administrative processes at their disposal, the court 
held that Caltrans had consummated its duties as a federal agency, allowing for ju-
dicial review.31 Therefore, a final agency action is an action in which an agency ful-
fills their legal duty as a federal agency, specifically. 
The D.C. Circuit further illustrated the contours of the final agency doctrine 
in Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Department of Labor, holding that civil penalties qualify as le-
gal consequences in the context of final agency action doctrine.32 In that case, the 
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor investigated Rhea Lana, Inc. 
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and determined that the 
company’s consignor-volunteers were employees under the FLSA who were enti-
tled to wages.33 The agency sent two letters: one to the consignor-volunteers en-
couraging them to bring suit under FLSA and another to Rhea Lana.34 These let-
ters explained the FLSA violations  and informed the company that the company 
 24. See id. at 178. 
 25. Id. at 159. 
 26. Id. at 178. 
 27. Pacificans for a Scenic Coast v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 204 F.Supp.3d 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 
2016). Notably, this holding may be characterized as dicta, since the court suggests that final agency 
action is not required in Endangered Species Act citizen-suit cases. See id. at 1085. 
 28. Id. at 1082. 
 29. Id. at 1081-82. 
 30. Id. at 1086. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 33. Id. at 25. 
 34. Id. at 1025-26.  
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was on notice, that the agency would take no further action, and that penalties 
would be assessed for future violations.35 The court held that these letters consti-
tuted final agency action.36 The court reasoned that since the letter made Rhea La-
na a candidate for civil penalties, sufficient legal consequences attached for it to 
qualify as final agency action.37 Thus, civil penalties qualify as legal consequences 
in the context of final agency action doctrine. 
The Fifth Circuit considered a final agency action question in Veldhoen v. U.S. 
Coast Guard. There, the court examined what traditionally does not look like a final 
agency action: namely, an attempt to “shortcut” administrative proceedings.38 In 
this case the U.S. Coast Guard convened a Marine Board to investigate a high-seas 
collision, and the sailors involved sought a declaratory judgment from the district 
court for lack of jurisdiction.39 The court, however, noted that legal rights and ob-
ligations did not attach to this decision and held that the Marine Board Inquiry 
was not a final agency action.40 The basic doctrine of Bennett is built around a view 
that the final agency action doctrine should be exercised in the context of private 
property rights.41 After all, when an agency action implicates such rights, the ques-
tion as to whether an agency decision is final and reviewable does hinge on the at-
tachment of rights.42 It makes sense to frame the doctrine in such a way when con-
sidering private property rights, because a simple rights attachment question is 
easily resolved in such a framework. Indeed, much of final agency action doctrine 
centers around private property rights.43 And, such reasoning naturally extends to 
public property rights (i.e. environmental law). 
When an agency makes a determination on private or public property rights, 
this determination naturally implicates a conflict between two parties – the private 
or public party and the government seeking to regulate in such a way as would im-
pede on the use of such party’s property – on a readily quantifiable issue. The 
property either belongs to the private or public party or the government. This is 
 35. See id. at 1026. 
 36. Id. at 1032. 
 37. Id.; see also W. Ill. Home Health Care, Inc. v. Herman, 150 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that a similar Department of Labor letter was a final agency action). 
 38. Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The obligation to defend 
oneself before an agency is not the type of obligation that creates final agency action.”). 
 39. Id. at 224. 
 40. Id. at 226. 
 41. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997) (decided in the context of water use for “rec-
reational, aesthetic and commercial purposes”). 
 42. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78 (1997) (holding that, in order for an action to be a final agen-
cy action, it must (1) mark the “consummation of the agency’s decision making process,” and (2) must 
be an action by which “rights or obligations have been determined” or from which “legal consequences 
will flow”). 
 43. See Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Veld-
hoen, 35 F.3d at 226.  
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illustrated in Bennett as a dispute between parties both public and private – state 
organizations and ranchers who use the water for discrete property – based purpos-
es – and the federal government seeking to regulate that water in order to protect 
an endangered species.44 As such, the court must analyze the issue in respect to the 
conflict between a discrete property right and a general governmental interest. 
However, cultural heritage rights are not so easily divided or quantifiable, giv-
en the multitude of potential stakeholders involved in each claim, the difficulty in-
herent in determining affiliation, and the sensitive political and ethical issues un-
derlying such a determination. For instance, under NAGPRA, an agency must 
make a determination as to cultural affiliation with regard to human remains, asso-
ciated funerary objects and other sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony 
and then must repatriate the items to the proper culture.45 NAGPRA further de-
fines “cultural affiliation” as when “there is a relationship of shared group identity 
which can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between a present day 
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group.”46 
As such, the right that is being determined is not simply the federal government’s, 
but those of the various tribes that the remains may be associated with and the de-
ceased individual themselves. Such rights implicate complicated issues of tribal 
sovereignty and human dignity not typically implicate in respect to traditional, re-
source-centric, property rights. One could even characterize the right as belonging 
to the objects themselves in many cases, given that many such objects are human 
remains. When the object is human remains, the agency determines which tribe 
that person is to be returned to in accordance with the rights given to such tribes.47 
Additionally, these remains and items are typically very old with vague identifiers 
as to cultural affiliation.48 Because of the unique context of these rights, the arti-
facts present a determination that is not easily divided or quantifiable. This results 
in administrative unworkability when applied to cases in which items are not easily 
identifiable and may be attributed to multiple different tribes, both large and 
small. 
 44. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 160 (1997). 
 45. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2012). 
 46. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2) (2012). 
 47. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2012). 
 48. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (Ikuta, 
J., dissenting): 
The Canyon has been inhabited by humans for nearly 4,500 years and has been home to 
permanent settlements for about 2,000 years. Starting around 750 A.D. the Canyon became 
home to the ancient Pueblo, sometimes referred to as the Anasazi. The ancient Pueblo re-
mained in the Canyon until about 1300, when they left to seek better farmlands. Their de-
scendants, the Hopi Indians, continued to live in the Canyon until about 1600. The modem 
Zuni and Hopi Indians are the descendants of the ancient Pueblo. The Navajos are relative 
newcomers, arriving at the Canyon around 1700.  
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B.  NAGPRA and the Inventory Process 
Passed in 1990, NAGPRA sought to “provide for the protection of Native 
American graves.”49 There is some disagreement as to why NAGPRA was original-
ly passed. Some commentators argue that it was passed in order to form a com-
promise between scientists, and America generally, seeking to study Native Ameri-
can human remains and sacred objects and tribes seeking to bury their dead and 
reclaim their cultural artifacts.50 The other, more supported, view is that 
NAGPRA was passed in response to an ugly history of colonial archaeologists ef-
fectively looting and grave-robbing without any respect for the sovereignty of trib-
al nations.51 In this respect, NAGPRA was passed to create positive law establish-
ing the right tribal nations have to remains and cultural objects affiliated with 
them. Broadly speaking, NAGPRA details the administrative procedures that must 
be followed to repatriate Native American human remains and associated cultural 
objects possessed by museums and federal agencies.52 Museums failing to comply 
may be assessed a civil penalty,53 and anyone who “knowingly sells, purchases, uses 
for profit, or transports for sale or profit” such remains, and items may be criminal-
ly prosecuted.54 
Under NAGPRA, federal agencies and museums must compile an inventory 
of all Native American human remains and associated funerary objects to which 
they have possession or control over to determine geographic and cultural affilia-
tion.55 NAGPRA outlines several requirements for this process. Agencies must 
complete these inventories “in consultation with tribal government and Native 
Hawaiian organization officials and traditional religious leaders” and must make 
the inventories available “both during the time they are being conducted and af-
terward to a review committee established under section 3006 of [Title 25 of the 
U.S. Code].”56 
NAGPRA also requires that such inventories be completed no later than “the 
date that is 5 years after November 1990,”57 although this deadline may be extend-
 49. Native American Graves Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990). 
 50. Cf. Clayton W. Dumont, Contesting Scientists’ Narration of NAGPRA’s Legislative History: Rule 
10.11 and the Recovery of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Ancestors, 26 WICAZO SA REV. 5, 6 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 14. 
 52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012). 
 53. 25 U.S.C. § 3007(a) (2012). 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2012). 
 55. See 25 U.S.C. § 3003(a) (2012): 
Each Federal agency and each museum which has possession or control over holdings or col-
lections of Native American human remains and associated funerary objects shall compile an 
inventory of such items and, to the extent possible based on information possessed by such 
museum or Federal agency, identify the geographical and cultural affiliation of such item. 
 56. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 57. Id.  
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ed through an appeal to the Secretary of the Interior if a good faith effort to con-
duct an inventory has been made.58 That means that practically all inventories are 
put under a broadly defined time limit. Given the narrow nature of the deadline 
and the ongoing discovery of Native American artifacts and human remains on 
federal territory, many inventory processes are still ongoing. Upon completion of 
the process, agencies must provide notice to the affected American Indian tribes 
and Native Hawaiian organizations within six months.59 The Code of Federal 
Regulations contain a number of provisions detailing the application of NAGPRA 
to agency action and its ensuing implementation.60 Once an inventory is complet-
ed, the National NAGPRA Program posts the inventory as a notice in the Federal 
Register.61 
Subsequent lower court case law has filled in the interstices of the NAGPRA 
inventory process in practice. As an example, NAGPRA does not require the in-
tentional excavation of items in the inventory process.62 As such, the duty to in-
ventory is only triggered once the relevant items have already been excavated.63 
Additionally, although NAGPRA does require ongoing consultation with Ameri-
can Indian tribes, such a requirement has presented a fairly low bar.64 To properly 
inventory items under NAGPRA, an agency must be allowed to engage in research 
to determine cultural affiliation.65 Once the inventory process is completed, how-
ever, a federal agency may not further delay repatriation by conducting additional 
research.66 
Scholars and advocates have viewed NAGPRA as representing  shift in the re-
lationship between the United States federal government and American Indian 
tribes to one of trust through respect for tribal sovereignty and acknowledgement 
of past colonial wrongs.67 Given the statute’s legislative history, NAGPRA re-
spects tribal sovereignty and serves as an example of the federal government ac-
tively working to respect and protect tribal culture – a noble goal in light of count-
less atrocities committed by the United States in the past.68 But the 
 58. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(c) (2012). 
 59. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(d) (2012). 
 60. 43 C.F.R. § 10 (2010). 
 61. 43 C.F.R. § 10.9(e)(7) (2010). 
 62. Geronimo v. Obama, 725 F.Supp.2d 182, 187 n.4 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1219 
(D. Nev. 2006) (holding that, because “there were at least some meetings that touched on the affiliation 
issue and would be considered consultation,” the Bureau of Land Management had met its consultation 
duty). 
 65. Na Iwi O Na Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F.Supp. 1397, 1412 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 66. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 3003(b)(2) (2012). 
 67. See Lauryne Wright, Focusing on American Indians in Cultural Resource Preservation Laws, 47 
ADVOCATE 20, 20-21 (2004); see also Dumont, supra note 50, at 14. 
 68. Dumont, supra note 50, at 14.  
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implementation of NAGPRA has not been without criticism. Critics maintain that 
NAGPRA fails to protect the rights of tribes that are not federally recognized69 
and does not adequately cover ancient remains or remains not discovered on feder-
al lands.70 Regardless of these weaknesses, the law remains an essential judicial tool 
that Native American tribes can use to work with the federal government to pro-
tect their cultural sovereignty and ensure respect for their dead. 
NAGPRA’s interaction with the APA – in particular, the APA’s “final agency 
action” requirement – raises further difficulties with respect to the fair administra-
tion of justice and the need for culturally-inclusive protection of cultural heritage 
rights. As has been discussed, under the APA, final agency actions can be reviewed 
by a court,71 and agency actions that are not final remain unreviewable.72 The fed-
eral judicial system is an essential tool for Native American tribes to contest agen-
cy action regarding their cultural heritage and the remains of their ancestors.73 If 
an agency refuses to repatriate an object, a tribe can bring that decision to the judi-
cial branch to protect their rights.74 But the NAGPRA inventory process raises 
problems in this regime. The complicated study, contentious politics, and slow-
moving nature of bureaucracy delays the inventory process significantly.75 Because 
of this, tribes are essentially shut out from repatriation of their remains and cultur-
al objects for long periods of time while civil servant anthropologists work to de-
termine the precise affiliation of the items being inventoried. Due to the age of the 
objects involved in the inventory process, determinations of affiliation can be re-
markably difficult, and the specific heritage of an object can remain unclear even 
after a determination is made.76 This situation presents a difficult problem where 
both sides have valid concerns. This problem has been at the center of very recent 
case law dealing with the intersection of NAGPRA and the APA. 
II.  NAVAJO NATION’S CENTRAL QUESTION 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Department of the Interior presents an application of final 
agency action doctrine to the NAGPRA inventory process.77 The case, and its ef-
 69. Edward D. Melillo, Make No Bones About It: The Need to Reform the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 149, 156-57 (2017). 
 70. Id. at 156-59. 
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see, e.g., Na Iwi O Na Kupuna O Mokau v. Dalton, 894 F.Supp. 1397, 1403 (D. Haw. 
1995); Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 74. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 1096 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 1085-86.  
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fect on NAGPRA, raise criticism as it contravenes the purposes of the final agency 
action doctrine, NAGPRA, as well as other law cited in Navajo Nation.78 
A.  Navajo Nation: NAGPRA and the APA Applied 
Navajo Nation presents a problem in the application of the “final agency ac-
tion” doctrine to NAGPRA.79 In Navajo Nation, the Federal Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit was forced to determine whether the Navajo Nation could seek 
judicial review of the determination by the National Park Service (“NPS”) that the 
NAGPRA inventory process applies to Native American remains in the NPS’s 
possession.80 More specifically, the Navajo Nation challenged the applicability of 
NAGPRA to the remains that were being inventoried, claiming that a treaty made 
in 1868 applied instead.81 Accordingly, the court decided that the application and 
subsequent beginning of the inventory process under NAGPRA is a judicially re-
viewable final agency action.82 
In reaching this holding, citing Bennett v. Spear, Judge Christen characterized 
the National Park Service’s initiation of the inventory process as the “consumma-
tion of the Park Service’s decision[-]making process regarding which statutory 
scheme would apply to determine the Navajo Nation’s property interests in the 
remains and objects,” and further signified that “significant legal consequences 
flow from the decision.”83 The court further reasoned that “an agency’s determina-
tion of its jurisdiction is the consummation of agency decision[-]making regarding 
that issue.”84 Since the National Park Service effectively determined its jurisdic-
tion over the remains by beginning the inventory process on them, they met the 
first prong of the Bennett test.85 
As to the second prong of the Bennett test, the court reasoned that the Nation-
al Park Service’s decision to apply NAGPRA to the remains determined its prop-
erty rights over the objects because the National Park Service only inventories re-
mains or objects within their “possession or control.”86 The court then cited a 
number of implementing regulations that support this interpretation.87 Since 
 78. Id. at 1095-1102 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 1085-86. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1085-87. 
 82. Id. The court also decided in the affirmative on the question on whether the claim was ripe 
for review, a holding which will not be examined in this Note. Id. at 1095. 
 83. Id. at 1091 (quoting Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). 
 84. Id. (citing Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 589-
90 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 85. Id. at 1092. 
 86. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3003(a)). 
 87. Id. (quoting 43 C.F.R. §§ 10.2(a)(3)(I) & 10.2(a)(3)(h)).  
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NAGPRA had been applied there, and not the alternative schemes under the 1868 
treaty between the United States and the Navajo Nation, the facts before the court 
met the second prong of Bennett.88 
It is important to consider the unique context before the court here, which il-
lustrates problems concerning the extraordinarily lengthy nature of the inventory 
process that may have impacted the court’s decision. The Navajo Nation was con-
testing the application of NAGPRA to remains and artifacts found at Canyon de 
Chelly National Park to which the Navajo Nation maintains belong to them.89 The 
facts present a sluggish, fifteen year-long inventory process, stemming either from 
the nature of governmental bureaucracy,90 ongoing resistance from the Navajo Na-
tion,91 or both. Notably, the process itself implicates a violation of the Navajo Na-
tion’s religious rights because the inventory process keeps the remains in question 
from being returned to the Navajo Nation.92 
Canyon de Chelly’s complex pre-colonial history is particularly important to 
the court’s decision and the issues before it, presented by the Navajo Nation majori-
ty as follows: 
Humans have lived in the canyon’s caves for thousands of years. Hopi 
and Pueblo Indians were the canyon’s primary occupants from roughly 
750 A.D. until the 1600s. The Navajo began living in the canyon in sig-
nificant numbers around the late 1600s.  Navajo live in the canyon to this 
day and consider Canyon de Chelly sacred ground. Navajo creation sto-
ries include events in the canyon, and Navajo lore maintains that key 
spiritual figures still reside there.93 
After the United States began expanding into the West, the federal government 
signed a treaty in 1849 acknowledging that the Navajo Nation was “under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction and protection of the government of the said United States.”94 
This treaty was broken when the government forced the Navajo to relocate to Fort 
Sumner, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Navajo.95 Four years later, the gov-
ernment allowed the Navajo to return to Canyon de Chelly, and an 1868 treaty es-
tablished a reservation for the Navajo that included Canyon de Chelly.96 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1085. 
 90. Id. at 1090. 
 91. Id. at 1096 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 1094-95. 
 93. Id. at 1086-87. 
 94. Id. at 1087 (quoting America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Navajo Nation, Sep-
tember 9, 1849, 9 Stat. 974, 974). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
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In 1931, under the Antiquities Act, a national monument was created at Can-
yon de Chelly.97 This Act retained title of the lands at the monument to the Nava-
jo while charging the federal government with “care, maintenance, preservation 
and restoration of the prehistoric ruins, or other features of scientific or historical 
interest” in the monument.”98 Another statute essential to the court’s reasoning is 
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (“ARPA”).99 Passed in 1979, the 
ARPA distinguishes “public lands” and “Indian lands” held in trust by the United 
States.100 Under the ARPA, the United States must obtain a permit in order to ex-
cavate or remove archaeological resources on Indian lands.101 
Considering the unique facts at issue, the Ninth Circuit presents strong rea-
sons for its determination. After all, the Navajo Nation had dealt with fifteen years 
of bureaucracy that they could reasonably interpret to have been harming the re-
mains of the Navajo people. Regardless, the holding presents a major theoretical 
and practical problem. By holding that the beginning of the NAGPRA inventory 
process is in and of itself a judicially reviewable “final agency action” under Ben-
nett, the Court is essentially holding that the beginning of an agency action can be 
a final agency action. This would seem inconsistent with what has traditionally 
been held to be a final agency actions – namely, decisions to which agencies have 
no subsequent procedures.102 As such, this exposes the Navajo Nation decision to 
significant criticism.103 Such criticism towards the court may, however, be mis-
placed. The real problem may lie in the contradictions between final agency action 
doctrine, the APA, and NAGPRA, both in purpose and when applied, and the re-
sultant unworkability of the broader regulatory scheme when all of these laws are 
considered together. 
B.  Criticism of Navajo Nation 
The Navajo Nation decision, while somewhat legally coherent, treats human 
remains as property and results in administrative unworkability. As such, the deci-
sion is subject to criticism on various grounds, as it fails to consider the unique na-
ture of cultural heritage rights, and conflicts with the purposes of the APA and 
NAGPRA. This will be discussed in the following section. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 445a-445b). 
 99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2017). 
 100. Id. §§ 470bb(3)-(4) (2017). 
 101. Id. § 470ee(a) (2017). 
 102. See Pacificans for a Scenic Coast v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 204 F.Supp 1075, 1086 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016) (holding that approvals for developments that may harm the environment constitute final 
agency action); see also Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (hold-
ing that Department of Labor letter indicating the use of volunteer workers to organize consignment 
sales constitutes final agency action). 
 103. See Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1096-1102 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).  
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1.  The Failure to Consider Cultural Heritage Rights as  
Implicated Under NAGPRA 
The holding of Navajo Nation conflicts with the doctrine underlying previous 
cases that applied final agency action doctrine to agency decision-making. The dis-
sent in the Navajo Nation decision views the case as inconsistent with existing case 
law and therefore, wrongly decided.104 However, the conflict highlights a funda-
mental problem present in the APA and final agency action doctrine when applied 
to issues of cultural heritage, like the NAGPRA inventory process. 
Final agency action case law, as discussed earlier, seems to conflict with Nava-
jo Nation’s result. These decisions show that the determination of whether there is 
a “consummation of agency decision-making” hinges on the legal consequences of 
an agency action.105 At the same time, however, these decisions are typically associ-
ated with a lack of federal-level agency process after the decision in question.106 
In Navajo Nation, however, the National Park Service clearly was not at the 
end of its process. The decision occurred in the middle of the inventory process 
required under NAGPRA.107 In this respect, Navajo Nation’s factual predicate is 
closer to that of Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard. 108 Both cases involve challenges to 
the applicability of an administrative process during the process itself, and this 
unique context was important to the reasoning of a court that viewed such a chal-
lenge as a way to circumvent administrative processes.109 
Where the two cases diverge and where Navajo Nation is more consistent with 
final agency action case law is the issue of attachment of legal rights and obliga-
tions.110 The line of case law sets a fairly low bar as to that issue for what decisions 
attach legal rights and obligations; even relatively minor effects on a private party 
may qualify.111 In that respect, it is hard to argue that the agency’s decision in Nav-
ajo Nation does not qualify as implying a legal right or obligation, given that keep-
ing human remains in storage harms the religious beliefs of the Navajo.112 The re-
 104. See id. at 1095-1102 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 105. See Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 106. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997); see also Pacificans for a Scenic Coast v. 
Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 204 F.Supp 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 107. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 108. Veldhoen, 35 F.3d at 224. 
 109. See Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1090; see also Veldhoen, 35 F.3d at 226. 
 110. Compare Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1092 (holding that legal rights are attached to the Na-
tional Park Service’s decision to apply NAGPRA); with Veldhoen, 35 F.3d at 226 (noting a lack of legal 
rights and obligations attached to the Marine Board’s decision to simply recommend further civil or 
criminal action). 
 111. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158-59; see also Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 
1032 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 112. See Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1094-95.  
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sult does, however, seem in tension with the purposes of NAGPRA, and that ten-
sion will be discussed later. 
As illustrated above, a final agency action occurs when the agency has com-
pleted the administrative process in respect to its duties as a federal agency with no 
further agency action to consider.113 Such a reading of the doctrine, then, seems to 
conflict with Navajo Nation’s basic holding that a final agency action can occur at 
what is practically the beginning of a decision-making process.114 
Key to understanding this distinction is the fact that significant legal rights are 
attached to the choice of whether to apply NAGPRA or a treaty in Navajo Nation 
despite the fact that it continues to represent only the beginning of an agency’s 
process.115 In cases involving tangible property disputes, such as the ones that form 
much of final agency action doctrine, the two prongs – consummation of agency 
decision-making and attachment of legal rights and obligations – seem to go hand-
in-hand, as a property deprivation is typically associated with the end of an agen-
cy’s process.116 When this doctrine is applied to the vague, intangible nature of cul-
tural heritage rights, as in Navajo Nation, and courts are forced to consider the cul-
tural affiliation of deceased Native Americans through the lens of a doctrine that is 
meant to protect economic property,117 the application of final agency action doc-
trine breaks down. 
The technically correct resulting decision in this case appears unworkable to 
agencies, seems to disregard the rights of smaller tribes without litigation re-
sources, and treats human remains as property to be traded. After all, when deter-
mining cultural affiliation, archaeologists must sift thought a small amount of in-
formation connected to a vast period of time, meaning that such artifacts may 
belong to a variety of cultures.118 Further, any attempt to determine cultural affilia-
tion necessarily involves a potential violation of a tribe’s religious practices.119 Fi-
nally a superseding complex web of law exists from early American history that 
was drafted without any particular regard for the rights of the array of Native 
American tribes the United States effectively governs.120 
 113. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158-59; see also Pacificans for a Scenic Coast v. Cal. Dep’t of 
Transp., 204 F.Supp 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 114. See Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 115. See id. at 1094-95 (noting that selection of NAGPRA impacts tribal government consulta-
tion rights). 
 116. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158-59, 177-78 (holding that an agency action which modified a sys-
tem of dams and irrigation such as to implicate property interests of the state and ranchers was a final 
agency action). 
 117. See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 819 F.3d at 1092 (framing the determination of the heritage of the 
remains and associated objects in question as a question of property rights). 
 118. See id. at 1096 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 119. See id. at 1094. 
 120. See id. at 1087.  
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2.  The Result’s Conflict with the Purposes of the APA and NAGPRA 
Navajo Nation is further in tension with the rationale driving the APA, 
NAGPRA, treaties, and the Monument Act, which are also discussed in Navajo 
Nation.121 The stated purpose of the APA is “to improve the administration of jus-
tice by prescribing fair administrative procedure.”122 Such a vague stated purpose, 
however, provides little guidance on what Congress meant to accomplish with the 
passage of the APA. The House Judiciary Committee report on the APA sheds 
more light on precisely its purpose, stating that the legislative intent is as follows: 
to assure that the administration of government through administrative 
officers and agencies shall be conducted according to established and published 
procedures which adequately protect the public interests involved, the making of 
only reasonable and authorized regulations, the settlement of disputes in 
accordance with the law and the evidence, the impartial conferring of au-
thorized benefits or privileges, and the effectuation of the declared poli-
cies of Congress in full.123 
Essential to the APA is the establishment of set procedures in administrative 
law such that the public interest is efficiently protected.124 As such, it seems rea-
sonable to generally characterize the APA’s passage as intending to properly bal-
ance the role of the administrative state with the need to hold the administrative 
state accountable for decisions it makes that implicate public concerns.125 In the 
context of Navajo Nation, this can be characterized as balancing the role of the ad-
ministrative state in protecting the cultural heritage rights of all tribes covered un-
der NAGPRA, collectively, and the interest of the individual tribes that NAGPRA 
covers. 
As to the purposes behind the “final agency action” requirement in the im-
plementing statute,126 relevant case law provides the following purposes: 
(1) avoid premature interruption of administrative process;  (2) let agency 
develop necessary factual background upon which decisions should be 
based;  (3) permit agency to exercise discretion or apply expertise;  (4) 
improve efficiency of administrative process;  (5) conserve scarce judicial 
resources;  (6) give agency chance to discover and correct errors;  and (7) 
 121. See id. at 1090-91, 1089-95, 1093. 
 122. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 123. Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34 
GEO. L.J. 407, 407-08 (1946) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1980, at 18 (1946)) (emphasis added). The au-
thors of this article purport to establish a more cynical, though less supported, reading of Congress’ 
purpose, stating that it was passed with the intent to cripple administrative action. Id. at 408. 
 124. Id. at 408. 
 125. See id. 
 126. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  
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avoid possibility that flouting of administrative processes could weaken 
effectiveness of agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.127 
As such, the final agency action doctrine established in the implementing statute 
means to provide an avenue for the public to attain outside review of agency deci-
sion-making while allowing the agency to work unhindered while making a deci-
sion.128 This is essential to the Navajo Nation context: rights implicated by 
NAGPRA involve complex anthropological determinations that are often based on 
limited evidence and implicate sensitive political issues.129 
NAGPRA was passed with a clearly stated purpose: to “provide for the pro-
tection of Native American graves.”130 However, the underlying purpose is more 
detailed than that, which is well illustrated in the House Report provided to ac-
company the legislation by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The re-
port provides: 
[T]o protect Native American burial sites and the removal of human re-
mains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony 
on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands. The Act also sets up a 
process by which Federal agencies and museums receiving federal funds 
will inventory holdings of such remains and objects and work with appro-
priate Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations to reach agree-
ment on repatriation or other disposition of these remains and objects.131 
This is reflected in commentary that has been previously discussed, stating that 
NAGPRA represents an effort by the federal government to repair its relationship 
with Native American tribes, foster trust between the varied entities involved, and 
protect Native American cultural identity.132 In the context of Navajo Nation, 
NAGPRA implicates the relationship between the National Park Service, the Nav-
ajo Nation, and any other tribes to which the remains in question could be associ-
ated. 
It is, of course, essential to consider the other statutes at play in Navajo Na-
tion. ARPA’s implementing legislation was established to protect “archaeological 
resources on public lands and Indian lands,”133 and it is reasonable to read an intent 
 127. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. Richmond, 841 F.Supp. 1039, 1044 (D. Or. 1993). 
 128. See Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Here, the sailors’ 
petition was filed in district court in an attempt to shortcut the proceedings at the start of the Marine 
Board inquiry. The finality doctrine, however, does not allow this circumnavigation.”). 
 129. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (Ikuta, 
J., dissenting). 
 130. Native American Graves Protection Act, Pub. L No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048, 3048 (1990). 
 131. H.R. REP. NO. 101-877, at 4367-68 (1990). 
 132. See Wright, supra note 67, at 23-24. 
 133. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (2014)).  
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to protect Native American cultural heritage and tribal sovereignty in the text of 
the act, given the strict requirement that archaeologists obtain permits prior to the 
excavation of archaeological resources on “Indian lands.”134 
Of further interest is the Treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Nation, which estab-
lishes the Navajo Reservation containing Canyon de Chelly.135 Given that this 
ended a period of hostility between the Navajo and the United States, stemming 
from a previously broken treaty made in 1849, it is reasonable to attribute some 
level of intent to cease hostilities and give Native American tribes some level of 
tribal sovereignty.136 The Monument Act, passed in 1931, established the national 
monument of Canyon de Chelly within the Navajo Reservation. It further gave the 
Navajo Nation title to the lands in the monument but charged the National Park 
Service with “the administration of the area of said national monument, so far as it 
applies to the care, maintenance, preservation and restoration of the prehistoric 
ruins, or other features of scientific or historical interest within the area.”137 As 
such, by giving the Navajo Nation title to the lands of the monument, the Monu-
ment Act seeks to maintain tribal sovereignty while establishing the monument, 
but also requires that the National Park Service follow its duties under federal law 
regarding the area around the monument. 
The final agency action doctrine as applied in Navajo Nation, as has been illus-
trated, creates results that would seem to contravene many of the purposes in the 
underlying complex web of laws analyzed in the opinion. Most basically, the doc-
trine seems to conflict with its own purposes, making the system more inefficient 
and resulting in what many may view as premature interruption, as it allows for 
litigation to commence before anyone knows what tribe the remains or artifacts are 
associated with.138 In regards to the APA, the doctrine only serves to confuse the 
procedure in question and places an undue burden on administrative agencies by 
allowing for judicial review at any point in the NAGPRA inventory process if 
there is some arguable question of which law applies.139 
Final agency action doctrine as applied in Navajo Nation contravenes the pur-
pose of NAGPRA in particular, given that the inventory process is meant to en-
sure that human remains are returned to their proper nation and regulates the re-
moval of human remains found on “Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”140 
 134. 16. U.S.C. § 470cc(g) (2014). 
 135. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Navajo 
Nation, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, 668. 
 136. See id. (noting that no persons, except those authorized, shall enter upon Indian reservations 
in discharge of duties imposed by law). 
 137. 16 U.S.C. §§ 445a-445b (2017). 
 138. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. Richmond, 841 F.Supp. 1039, 1044 (D. Or. 1993). 
 139. See Blachly & Oatman, supra note 123, at 407-08 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, 2d Sess. 
at 18 (1946)). 
 140. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-877, at 8-9 (1990) (The act works to return items to the rightful 
owners.); see also Wright, supra note 67, at 23-24.  
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The application of final agency action doctrine here serves to remove any sem-
blance of such regulation and forces a view of the human remains as property, 
owned by either a tribe or the government, rather than human beings who should 
be returned to their native cultures through a process that is as accurate as possible. 
It further ignores the interests of other Native American tribes to which the human 
remains may be attributed to, such as the Hopi tribe,141 in favor of a scheme that 
gives more power to tribes with the resources to seek judicial review at the begin-
ning of the NAGPRA inventory process. 
With the complicated system of treaties and statutes that serve to establish 
Canyon de Chelly, the present application also serves to complicate and obscure 
the practicability of such laws. Canyon de Chelly, essentially both federal and 
Navajo land, presents a situation in which the Navajo have control over the proper-
ty, but the National Park Service has control over the administration of the land.142 
Practically speaking, this means that Navajo have property rights associated with 
the land and the National Park Service exercises managerial duties over the land.143 
Since the doctrine here is centered around property rights,144 it seems to only con-
sider the former, ignoring the application of federal laws to Canyon de Chelly and 
the implicated rights and responsibilities.145 In doing so, it contravenes the purpose 
of the act to delineate a balance between the two. 
Given this illustrated doctrinal conflict, the final agency action doctrine leaves 
the underlying statutory scheme unworkable. It hampers the ability for administra-
tive agencies to work under the APA,146 serves to limit the rights given to every 
Native American tribe through NAGPRA,147 and contravenes the establishment of 
mixed property and administrative rights and duties under the act establishing 
Canyon de Chelly.148 In developing an administrative scheme framing issues of 
cultural heritage rights as that only of tangible property, the final agency action 
doctrine as applied damages the purpose of most modern Indian Law – to foster 
trust between sovereign tribal governments and the federal government149 – by 
creating a scheme that destroys the very avenues that were created to establish a 
dialogue between Native American tribes and the federal government. 
 141. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 445a-445b (1931). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1997) (holding that an agency action which 
modified a system of dams and irrigation such as to implicate property interests of the state and ranch-
ers was a final agency action). 
 145. 16 U.S.C. §§ 445a-445b (2017). 
 146. See, e.g., Blachly & Oatman, supra note 123, at 407-08 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79 -1980, 2d 
Sess. at 18 (1946)). 
 147. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-877, at 3-4, 8-10 (1990); see also Wright, supra note 66, at 20-21. 
 148. 16 U.S.C. §§ 445a-445b (1931). 
 149. See Wright, supra note 67, at 23-24.  
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III.  GOING FORWARD 
As has been illustrated, the law as applied in Navajo Nation conflicts with itself 
– the APA, NAGPRA, other statutes, and final agency action doctrine all interact 
to counteract the underlying purpose of every law involved – and this creates an 
unworkable administrative scheme. It may be easy to blame this issue on an incor-
rect application of the law by the Navajo Nation court,150 but such a view would be 
wrongheaded. The problem does not lie with the Navajo Nation majority, nor the 
Navajo Nation or the National Park Service. It lies with an underlying doctrine 
that fails to consider final agency action in the context of the right to cultural her-
itage. 
Considering this problem, the courts or the legislature must modify the law to 
adequately protect the unique nature of the rights in question. The courts could 
establish an alternative line of reasoning to apply to rights implicating cultural her-
itage concerns. Such reasoning would adequately represent all parties who may 
have rights in a given case and allow the government to utilize a workable legal 
doctrine. 
The legislature should pass statutes governing this area of the law and creating 
clearer rules as to these rights: rules that currently largely do not exist outside of 
the realm of the judicial branch.151 Such an alternative scheme should establish that 
judicial review of an agency decision implicating cultural heritage rights cannot be 
obtained until after the agency determines cultural affiliation. Only then will an 
agency action be considered a final agency action. To prevent abuse by federal 
agencies, a party who seeks judicial review might be able to circumvent this re-
quirement by showing that the agency is not fulfilling its statutory duties and that 
(although no cultural affiliation has been determined) its decision is a de facto final 
agency action. 
Regardless of what specific scheme is ultimately adopted, it seems clear that 
some line of rules regarding final agency action need to be developed specifically 
for contexts implicating cultural heritage rights, particularly those of Native Amer-
ican tribes. This principle may further apply to other cultural heritage contexts, 
including the rights of other minority cultures and the complex web of internation-
al laws governing cultural heritage. By doing so, the cultural heritage rights of all 
tribes, large and small, with an interest in the cultural affiliation of a specific ob-
ject, can be adequately protected. 
Some may argue that this scheme is perfectly functional as is and serves to 
protect the rights of indigenous cultures through the use of litigation. However, 
 150. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016) (Ikuta, 
J., dissenting) (“The majority’s strained attempt to detect a “final agency action” occurring at some 
point along the way, without a decisionmaking process, a written decision, or a determination that has 
any legal effect on the Navajo Nation, has no support in the record or in our precedent.”). 
 151. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (holding that a final agency action must be 
“one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined’”).  
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NAGPRA, at its core, exists not to provide a cause of action, but to cement respect 
for tribal culture and sovereignty. It provides for an administrative scheme to en-
shrine such respect in the law and treating it as a simply cause of action works to 
dismantle that scheme. It could also be argued that tribes must be given a robust 
avenue to challenge administrative decisions in order to fully protect their rights. 
Such an argument is compelling given the United States’ history of colonialism, 
oppression, and graverobbing. However, NAGPRA was created to protect the 
rights of all federally recognized Native American tribes. Allowing this scheme to 
function as a cause of action necessarily gives more power to larger tribes with 
more political power, who have more resources to spend on litigation. Such an ad-
versarial system would ignore the rights of smaller tribes in favor of large ones. As 
such, a new system of rules should be established to protect both. 
CONCLUSION 
Navajo Nation was not a poorly-reasoned, wrongly-decided case. The resulting 
doctrine, however, resulted in the unworkability of the sector of the administrative 
state that manages cultural heritage. The court was required to apply the complex 
doctrine of final agency action to the context of NAGPRA and gave an opinion 
that highlighted the problems currently present in the law. 
In the context of NAGPRA, final agency action doctrine created a result that 
seems to conflict with itself. Although some case law would implicate a question as 
to whether the result is within the purpose of the doctrine, on a basic level, the re-
sult is within the guidelines set by law. It does, however, appear to allow for the 
circumvention of an administrative process, which final agency action doctrine was 
designed to prevent. Final agency action doctrine further contravenes the purposes 
of NAGPRA, creating an unworkable inventory process and ignoring the rights of 
smaller and less powerful Native American tribes. 
Considering these doctrinal contradictions, it is essential that courts or the 
legislature work to develop a line of law that manages the unique circumstances of 
cultural heritage laws like NAGPRA, so that the administrative state can function. 
An effective administrative state allows the federal government to actively work 
with Native American tribes to properly repatriate sacred objects. If such workable 
procedures exist, then NAGPRA’s goals can best be met. 
 
 
